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Abstract
Proper hazard identification in safety reports has become progressiveiy more difficult to achieve.
Severai major incidents in Europe in récent years, such as Buncefield and Toulouse, were not even
considered by their site Seveso I I Safety Case. One of the reasons is that available hazard
identification (HAZID) méthodologies take no notice of least likely or unknown events. Non-
identified scénarios thus constitute a latent risk, whose management is extremely complex and
open-ended. Hence this work aims to investigate thé issue of atypical scénarios and explain how
they could hâve been identified.
An in-depth historical analysis of some of thèse incidents has been performed, in order to outline
gênerai features of plants in which they occurred, their causes, conséquences and lessons learned.
This analysis has followed a précise common scheme, which allowed a systematic approach to the
problem. Based on the findings, failures connected to risk management and risk appraisal hâve
been identified. Checklist questions and recommendations wîll be compiled, making efforts to
improve the gênerai safety of industry. Attempts will be made to review well-known HAZID
méthodologies, and thus the process of risk appraisal, with the purpose of improving the HAZID
processes to identify atypical scénarios.
1 Introduction
In récent years, Europe has witnessed the occurrence of two major accidents that had great
relevance within society, because of the deaths, injuries and damages they caused, and also
because of their peculiarity and unpredictability. Indeed, the incident scénarios that actually
occurred were not taken into account by their site safety reports, thus rendering the operators
unprepared for the emergency. Moreover, the whole rîsk governance was based on différent kinds
of incidents, which in certain ways may be considered less dangerous and easier to control.Thèse
atypical major accidents are the ammonium nitrate (AN) explosion at the AZF fertiliser factory in
Toulouse (France) and the Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) at the Buncefield oil storage dépôt in
Hemel Hempstead (UK).
This work shows an in-depth analysis of some of thèse unexpected incidents, in order to outline
gênerai features of plants in which they occurred, their causes, conséquences and lessons learned.
On the basis of the fîndings, well-known HAZID méthodologies hâve been studied and developed,
which wïll assist future HAZID processes used to identify atypical incident scénarios.
2 Historical incident analysis
2.1 Past atypical scénarios
The Toulouse incident occurred on 21s t September 2001. An explosion took place in a warehouse,
located among process, storage and packaging areas of the plant which mainly produced
ammonium nitrate (AN), ammonium nitrate-based fertilisers and other chemicals including
chlorinated compounds. Due to the vicinity of the plant to the city of Toulouse, the effects to
people and the damage were catastrophic. The explosion caused 30 fatalities and damages
estimated between €1,5 to €2,5 billion (Dechy and Mouilleau 2004). The warehouse was used as a
temporary storage of 'off-specifications'AN. This incident scénario was not considered in the safety
studies or in the Land Use Planning (LUP) safety perimeters (Salvi and Dechy 2005). In addition,
the Seveso I I directive did not cover the particular risk of loff-specification' AN (Directive
96/82/EC). Today this kind of material with badly defined properties is classified in (Directive
2003/105/EC) at a risk level similar to technical grade AN.
AN is a strong oxidative materîal; AN-based products hâve led to severai major accidents before
1950 (Table 1) with hundreds of fatalities and massive destruction due to the fact that the
détonation properties were poorly understood. With quality driven standards, régulation
frameworks and the promotion of better anti-caking agents (Marlaïr and Kordek 2005), very few
explosion accidents hâve occurred since the middle of 1950's (Table 1). The major explosion in
Toulouse was a severe reminder of the inhérent hazards associated with the handling and storage
of AN. Table 1 shows the more serious AN major explosions previous to Toulouse incident.
Similarly, despite the warnings about the extrême reactivity of ammonium nitrate, représentée! by
several incidents before the middle of 1950s (outlined in Table 1), due précautions were not taken
to prevent the risk of explosion. For instance, the group of buildings where the warehouse was
located was not equipped with a fire détection System (Dechy et al. 2004). Also in this case the
scénario that actually occurred had been underestimated due to the fact that the hazard
identification process failed to identîfy the risk.
In both the cases the incident scénarios were not deemed sufficiently crédible to be captured by
current HAZID méthodologies, but with hindsight it can be stated that they represent a real and
impending risk to industry and society. Thus, the current contribution aims to outline lessons and
recommendations, and to define a différent approach to the hazard identification process that
should help in identifyïng little known incident scénarios such as those which occurred at Buncefield
and Toulouse.
Scénarios of this kind, normally excluded by risk assessments, from this point on will be named as
atypical scénarios.
2.2 Methodology approach of historïcal incident anaiysis
The methodology of historical incident anaiysis is a way to better understand the actual
mechanisms of past accidents in order to avoid them in the future. The atypical incidents
mentioned (Buncefield and Toulouse) had some similar précédents, knowledge of which might hâve
helped in the safety assessment process, in order to foresee the atypical scénarios that occurred.
Hence, the development of a method for analysing past incidents may allow better knowledge
management and horizon scanning, which will lay the foundations for a more gênerai methodology
of hazard identification.
In order to agrée a systematic anaiysis of incidents, a common template for historical anaiysis has
been outlined. It is divided into five parts concerning différent aspects of possible incidents (Table
3).
Table 3: Historical incident anaiysis template
Part
A
B
C
D
General détails of
event and site
Event description
Causes and
Conséquences
Lesson learned and
corrective actions
Part items
- Accident location
- Date and time
- Short description of îndustrial setting involved
- Context of event
- Area and stakes vulnerability
- Main scénario
- Description of industrial process, substances and
materials involved
- Short description of incident and circumstances
- Timeline of events
- Initiating events and direct causes
- Failures in ERMF Emerging Risk Management Framework
- Faïlures in risk governance framework
- Conséquences and damages
- Event management
- After the event
- Main findings and officiai lessons
- Main officiai recommendations
- Feedback on corrective action implementation
- Diffusion of information and knowledge management
Figure 2: Risk governance framework
(ilMTeg-Risk Description of work 2009)
A référence to thèse frameworks is a way to better organise and understand the root and direct
causes of the incident. In this way, aspects of risk management that are lacking may be detected
early and included in any subséquent analysis.
Conséquences, damages, effects to system, people and environment are the other main topics of
this section that also aims to describe the emergency response measures taken during the incident
event and the actions to restore, repair and reclaim after the event.
Lessons Iearned from officiai investigations (foliowing corrective action) are reported in part D in
order to evaluate which aspects should be broadened and how they should be treated. Finally, part
E reports sources of information and références used.
3 First results
Up to now, five major incidents hâve been analysed by means of the template described (see
Table 4).
Table 4: Summary of atypiçal incidents analysed (Dechy ét al. 2004) (MIIB 2008)
Plant
typology
Substances
involved
Main incident
scénario
APmax (kPa)
Toulouse
(2001)
Chemical and
fertiliser
plant
Off-
specification
ammonium
nitrate
Reactive
chemical
explosion
150
Buncefield
(2005)
St Herblain
(1991)
Naples
(1985)
Newark
(1983)
Oil storage dépôt
Gasoline and fuel oils
Vapour cloud explosion
200 50 80 /
Toulouse and Buncefield hâve been previously described and used as examples of atypiçal incident
scénarios. St Herblain, Naples and Newark are quoted in Table 2 as vapour cloud explosions in oil
dépôts caused by LOC of gasoline. Analysis has highlighted important aspects of the incident event
and several failures of risk management, which would need corrective and resolving actions.
Plants involved in the incidents are characterised by the important fact that the dangerous
substances stored could represent a threat to the nearby population (see Table 4). In fact in some
cases thèse plants are located close to the urbanised area, as shown in Figure 3. The need to
properly identify hazards in thèse cases is even more important.
3.1 ERMF faiilures - Techm'cal, technological dimension
A clear example of failures of Technical, Technological' dimension of the ERMF is the event that
triggered the incident of St Herblain. The direct cause to the incident was attributed to the failure
of a rubber joint at the pipefitting (Figure 4) (Lechaudel and Pineau, 1992). The joint was
guaranteed by the manufacturer to last with a maximum aromatic concentration of 30%. Instead,
the incident occurred on the first day of opérations with a 98-octane gasoline with an aromatic
concentration of 55%. Gasoline released from the conséquent leak poured into a rétention basin,
where it vaporised and led to a mist formation (enhanced by 100% humidity in the vicinity of the
site).
Figure 4: Location of the failing rubber joint at the pipe fitting
Another faîlure of this dimension of risk management can be identified in the design of Buncefield
tanks, which may hâve contributed to the vapour/mist formation. Tests demonstrated (MHB 2008)
that a deflector plate on the top of the tank, like in Buncefield, channels only a part of the
overfilling fuel onto the tank wall but the rest runs over the top of the plate, fragmenting into
dropiets. Moreover, fuel running down the wall could hit structural stiffening rings and become
detached from the tank wall, creating another cascade of dropiets (Figure 5). Thèse conditions
would promote the evaporation of the lighter components of petrol, such as butanes, pentanes and
hexanes. The freefalli of dropiets Ieads to entrainment of air and mîxing between the air and fuel
vapour, and the formation of a rich fuel/air mixture.
Ullage ventilation hole
Fuel spilling over
deflector plate
Structural
stiffening ring
Figure 5: Pattern of fuel dispersion
four dimensions of ERMF framework. Thèse recommendations emphasised the need to increase the
technical protection provided by primary, secondary and tertiary containment Systems in oil
dépôts, without disregarding human and organisational factors. Recommendations address,
amongst others, compétent authority and central government leadership, in order to ensure thèse
improvements and an early response to a major incident. Finally, as the case of the incident at
Toulouse, it is suggested that a revïew of COMAH régulations (UK implementation of Seveso II) and
LUP processes be carried out, ensuring that they are based on a simplified, generic approach to
risk assessment for flammable storage sites (MIIB 2008).
4 Further development of work
By means of an hîstorical analysis of atypical incidents, direct and root causes hâve been identified,
Thèse causes can be attributed to common events such as improper rîsk management or to a more
gênerai failure of ineffective hazard identification. The combination of thèse causes has led to the
incident, as effectively explained by the 'Swiss cheese model' (Reason 1990) (Hudson et al. 1991).
In this case the différent slides represent the four dimensions of ERMF and the characteristic holes
of the Swiss cheese symbolise the failures. Figure 6 shows the application of this model to the
Buncefield case.
TECHINICAU
TECHNOLOGICAL
The design of the
tank itself hâve
contributed to ttie
vapour/mist
formation.
HUMAN/
MANAGEMENT
Rôle and
responsibilities of
contrai room
operators not
clearly défined and
front Une staff not
properiy trained to
be able to reliably
detect, diagnose
and respond to
potential incidents.
GOVERNANCE/
COMMUNICATION
Lack of a formai
methodology for
industry to
détermine safety
integrity levels
required for overfill
protection at dépôts
that store and
fransfer petroleum
products on a large
scale
POLICIES/
REGULATIONS/
STANDARDS
At a site like
Buncefield, land
use planning
considered as
worst crédible
scénario a major
liquid fuel pool fire.
Figure 6: Swiss cheese model applied to ERMF Buncefield case.
With the purpose of irnproving risk management for thèse type of industrial plants and, thus, to
close some of the holes in the cheese slices, checklist questions will be formulated, based on the
lessons learned from past failures.
Moreover, to address the incapability of HAZID methods to capture atypical scénarios, a bow-tie
methodology is being applied to plants involved in the accidents considered hère. Figure 7 shows
an example of an event tree referring to oil storage tanks of Buncefield oil dépôt.
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